

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04-04-2013		2. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) September 2012 - April 2013	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Regional Alignment of Army National Guard Brigades: Employing the Guard for Success in Building Partner Capacity				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Deaton, Robert B., Major, USARNG				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A	
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A					
14. ABSTRACT The U.S. Army's innovative method of regionally aligning brigades to support Geographic Combatant Commanders will enable partner capacity success. Integrating Army National Guard brigades into this concept provides significant capabilities to support theatre campaign plans. The National Guard's experience in partnership with foreign nations, its unique skill sets, and its familiarity with multiple inter-agency partners provide a wider range of options to the Combatant Commander. The Army National Guard is best suited to implement a Smart Power application to security and stability operations in all COCOMs. An added benefit of including ARNG formations in the Regionally Aligned Brigade concept is maintenance of its operational capability developed through the last decade of combat deployments. This capability is crucial to a strategic response capability for the United States that must not be lost as it has after past conflicts. Including the Army National Guard in the Regionally Aligned Brigade concept provides the COCOMs a critical capability to succeed in building partner capacity within their areas of responsibility.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Regionally Aligned Brigades, Building Partner Capacity, BPC, Army National Guard, ARNG					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Marine Corps University/Command and Staff College
a. REPORT Unclass	b. ABSTRACT Unclass	c. THIS PAGE Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

---

**TITLE:**

**Regional Alignment of Army National Guard Brigades: Employing the Guard for Success  
in Building Partner Capacity**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**AUTHOR:**

**MAJ R. BRIAN DEATON**

AY 12-13

---

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:

Craig J. Swanson

Approved: ✓

Date:

3 APRIL 2013

Oral Defense Committee Member:

Craig Swanson, Ph.D

Approved: JS

Date:

3 April 2013

## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** Regional Alignment of Army National Guard Brigades: Employing the Guard for Success in Building Partner Capacity

**Author:** Major R. Brian Deaton, United States Army National Guard

**Thesis:** The Army National Guard is ideal to accomplish Building Partner Capacity missions within the Army's Regionally Aligned Brigade concept.

**Discussion:** The U.S. Army's innovative method of regionally aligning brigades to support Geographic Combatant Commanders will enable partner capacity success. Integrating Army National Guard brigades into this concept provides significant capabilities to support theatre campaign plans. The National Guard's experience in partnership with foreign nations, its unique skill sets, and its familiarity with multiple inter-agency partners provide a wider range of options to the Combatant Commander. The Army National Guard is best suited to implement a Smart Power application to security and stability operations in all COCOMs. An added benefit of including ARNG formations in the Regional Aligned Brigade concept is maintenance of its operational capability developed through the last decade of combat deployments. This capability is crucial to a strategic response capability for the United States that must not be lost as it has after past conflicts.

**Conclusion:** Including the Army National Guard in the Regionally Aligned Brigade concept provides the COCOMs a critical capability to succeed in building partner capacity within their areas of responsibility.

## DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

## *Table of Contents*

	Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	ii
DISCLAIMER .....	iii
PREFACE .....	v
INTRODUCTION .....	1
CONTEXT .....	3
National Level Strategies .....	3
Army Strategy .....	5
Regionally Aligned Brigades .....	7
DISCUSSION .....	8
ARNG Operational Role .....	9
Smart Power Approach .....	13
Long Term Relationships .....	14
State Partnership .....	15
ARNG Unique Capabilities .....	16
Implications of Federalized ARNG .....	20
CONCLUSION .....	22
ENDNOTES .....	24
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	27

## *Preface*

The U.S Army and the Army National Guard have arrived at a crossroad. The legacy paradigm of large deterrent forces strategically arrayed to counter an existential threat is not valid in the current operational environment. The Army has re-oriented to building partner capacity in all of the geographic regions of the world by implementing the Regionally Aligned Brigade concept. The paradigm shift for the Army National Guard is much more complicated. It has been transformed away from an archaic and burdensome strategic reserve into a recognized operational reserve through persistent combat and contingency deployments. It must re-examine its mission and focus as the nation moves beyond the current conflict in Afghanistan and orients on building partner capacity around the world.

The question of utilizing the National Guard as part of the regional alignment concept is fundamental to maintaining the Guard as an operational reserve. If the National Guard is to continue to serve as a fully operational reserve for the nation then it must sustain its hard earned capabilities and readiness. Routine and sustainable deployments in operational environments can ensure that soldiers, leaders, and equipment remain relevant and effective.

I approached the question of employing the Army National Guard in the Regionally Aligned Brigade concept based on criteria of mission success. I attempted to determine what capabilities and skills must be employed to succeed in building partner capacity and then evaluated if Army National Guard forces could provide that success. Based on the evidence, I trust the reader will appreciate that the National Guard can not only provide capabilities equitable to the Active Component forces but also many distinctive competencies that will enhance the ability of Geographic Combatant Commanders to succeed in building partner capacity.

I would like to thank Dr. Charles D. McKenna for his time and mentorship in the development of my paper.

## **Introduction**

In the twentieth century, U.S. national security and global stability were assured through relatively large standing military forces, superior technological advantage, and a substantial forward based presence. The new paradigm is quite different. Twenty First Century threats to national security are dynamic and globally connected. Threats to national security and interests are no longer cyclic. The U.S. can no longer withdraw from military engagement and then expand when a new threat emerges. Stability is threatened in many regions of the world from extremism, trans-national criminal elements, and failed or failing states. To counter these extensive threats the Army is implementing the Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) concept to allocate conventional forces to Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) in order to execute Building Partner Capacity (BPC) missions in support of Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) plans. This method will rely on a Smart Power approach to support whole of government capabilities in order to prevent and deter conflict and deny safe haven to terrorist organizations. This concept will require multi-capable units working in coordination with governmental and non-governmental organizations to effect overall long term stability. The Army National Guard (ARNG) is the nation's most capable military force for successfully implementing the RAB concept. Integrating Army National Guard (ARNG) units in the RAB concept provides the Army with critical capabilities, widens the GCCs abilities to effectively engage with partner nations, and retains a critical operational capability within the Reserve Component.

The future is complicated. Over the next two years U.S. forces will complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. Forward based brigades in Europe will dwindle to only two. Fiscal constraints will reduce the defense budget by at least \$487 billion over the coming decade with additional cuts looming if sequestration occurs.<sup>1</sup> The Active Army will shrink to only 490,000

soldiers.<sup>2</sup> National security and interests are threatened by global asymmetric threats which require the military to remain strategically engaged around the world with emerging states as well as historical allies and partners. This is a drastic shift for conventional forces accustomed to relying on deterrence and overwhelming combat power to assure success. In contrast, the ARNG has been globally engaged with BPC since 1993. It has programs in place to effectively operate in BPC missions and provide critical capability to the GCCs.

Before the Global War on Terror the Active Component was the sole instrument of the Army to achieve its strategic objectives. The Reserve Component, particularly the National Guard, was strictly a Strategic Reserve and mobilized sparingly for operational use. This is no longer a valid construct. The ARNG is a vital element of the national defense plan. It is capable of full spectrum operations, from kinetic to diplomatic. Its historical interaction and partnerships with government and civilian leadership make it particularly well suited for implementing the RAB concept to build partner capacity. It has a long history of successfully supporting multiple levels of authority to provide the most robust solution. Unique capabilities, ranging from individual professional experience to highly specialized unit functions derived from its required mission sets, make it an ideal force to implement the multi-faceted BPC approach required.

Multiple national and military leaders have recognized the importance of the ARNG's contribution to the successful prosecution of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ARNG has evolved from an archaic strategic reserve to an operational force capable of effectively employing all levels of national power to achieve the nation's strategic security objectives. Moving forward the Army needs to fully integrate the ARNG as part of the Total Force to effectively meet its strategic vision of Prevent, Shape, and Win.<sup>3</sup>



## **Context**

Analysis of strategic security guidance provides the context of the current situation. The role of the military is defined and developed through multiple policy documents. The intent of strategic guidance is to focus the elements of national power in order to ensure national security and protect national interests around the globe. As a hierarchy, each document informs the next. Each subsequent document refines the overall intent and defines the endstate for that level of strategy. For the Army, these documents result in defining task and purpose in order to outline its mission and structure its force to accomplish the strategic goals of the nation.

## **National Strategy**

In the 2010 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), the President specifies that the nation will pursue comprehensive engagement and invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners.<sup>4</sup> Promoting security and stability throughout the world has been a policy of the United States for some time. Today it is imperative for the United States to remain globally engaged in order to ensure collective security.<sup>5</sup> Our current threats do not necessarily come from peer competitors. There are rogue nations attempting to influence and destabilize critical regions or non-state actors operating out of weak or failed states to threaten the interests of the United States. It is impossible for the U.S. to unilaterally defeat these threats. The most effective means of countering these threats is to promote security and stability around the world in order to deny safe haven to non-state actors and counter destabilizing effects from antagonistic regional states. To accomplish this, the NSS charges the military to “partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad

range of governments.”<sup>6</sup> These engagements are intended to strengthen security relationships that will prevent and deter conflict.<sup>7</sup> However, other elements of national power are also to be used to provide a broad capability.

The NSS is essentially the President’s articulation of the employment of national Smart Power to accomplish the national objectives in a heterogeneous environment. The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) defines Smart Power as:

Neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action. Providing for the global good is central to this effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world’s interests and values.<sup>8</sup>

Smart Power necessitates integration and employment of several elements of national power to achieve a full spectrum outcome. To effectively implement Smart Power, GCCs will require an adaptable force experienced in executing coordinated operations with all levels of government and all manner of agencies.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a subordinate document to the NSS from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and provides the military guidance to meet the President’s intent. It specifies that preventing and deterring conflict around the globe is a primary role of the military.<sup>9</sup> The QDR lists this task as one of the four U.S. Defense Objectives.<sup>10</sup> The principal way of accomplishing this objective is by partnering with nations around the world and increasing their ability to provide security and governance within their own borders. This approach is intended to contribute to defeating existing terrorist threats and to promote stability, which will reduce the potential for destabilization that leads to conflict. The

QDR clearly links weak states to national security interest by stating, “Terrorist groups seek to evade security forces by exploiting ungoverned and under governed areas as safe havens from which to recruit, indoctrinate, and train fighters, as well as to plan attacks on U.S. and allied interests.”<sup>11</sup> This statement clearly summarizes the strategic importance of building partner capacity through theatre security cooperation.

The QDR focuses on re-balancing the force in order to accomplish national security objectives. In order to achieve the national strategic objectives the force will concentrate on small engagements across the world. In November 2012, Secretary Panetta stated that the United States will invest in building partner capacity by using a small-footprint approach so that partner countries can be more effective in combating terrorism.<sup>12</sup> The QDR articulates that building partner capacity (BPC) has never been more important.<sup>13</sup> The combination of the QDR and the Secretary’s statement give clear guidance to the Army on both its mission and force employment strategy.

### **Army Strategy**

The 2012 Army Strategic Guidance (ASG) very succinctly articulates the vision of the Army.

The Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national (JIIM) environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America's Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to Prevent, Shape and Win.<sup>14</sup>

The ASG goes on to define Prevent, Shape, and Win and describe how those objectives support the NSS. Prevention is military centric and focuses on providing Security Force Assistance

(SFA).<sup>15</sup> This will enable nations to deter and defeat adversarial elements within their own borders. Shaping is JIIM centric and concentrates in BPC missions, which the Army defines as,

the process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems. It includes efforts to improve governance capacity, political moderation, and good governance—ethos as well as structure—as part of broader capacity-building activities within a society.<sup>16</sup>

Building partner capacity across an entire region, in support of a whole-of-government approach, shapes the environment to deny safe haven to belligerent elements and discourages regional conflict. Finally, to win the Army must be able to defeat Al Qaeda, adversary states, and non-state actors.<sup>17</sup> The Army has clearly recognized that winning is predicated on prevention and shaping, which develop partner nations to assist in defeating common enemies. In order to win the Army must succeed in preventing the spread of militant non-state actors and shaping the environment to foster strong capable partnerships around the globe. In order to accomplish all the components of Prevent, Shape, and Win the Army must focus its strategy on supporting the GCCs.

As the nation's primary land based armed force, the Army is refocusing its efforts to support all of the GCCs. It must, "transform itself from a force that focuses on counterinsurgency operations to an Army that is operationally adaptable, able to meet the range of Combatant Commander requirements."<sup>18</sup> The GCC requirements focus on ensuring security and stability within their regions through small footprint engagements as specified by the SECDEF. These engagements must meet JIIM requirements as well as military specific needs. As a force provider the Army is shaping and apportioning its force in order to facilitate the campaign plans of the GCC in order to Prevent, Shape, and Win. It must also be capable of

responding to unforeseen contingencies around the world. The challenge will be to accomplish all of this under difficult conditions. The most recent U.S. Army Capstone Concept (ACC) articulates the manner in which the Army will accomplish its objectives.

The U.S. Army Capstone Concept (ACC) makes eight assumptions regarding the future operational environment.<sup>19</sup> Four are particularly important:

1. Army forces will be based in the Continental United States (CONUS).
2. Fiscal constraints require rebalancing force structure priorities.
3. Army forces will deploy from the continental United States to Forward Operating Bases where access is denied.
4. The Army will rely on the reserve component to meet future commitments.

These assumptions have strategic implications regarding the employment and shape of the force. Basing and deploying forces from CONUS will require perpetuating an expeditionary mindset within the force, which has been developed over a decade of combat. Additional reduction or elimination of overseas posts will reduce the cultural understanding and geographic training capability of the force. Force reductions mandated by fiscal cuts places a greater burden on Army personnel and equipment under current operational tempo projections. Reliance on the Reserve Component can reduce the strain from operational tempo but requires that they retain the operational capability developed through extensive combat experience.

### **Regionally Aligned Brigades**

The solution for the Army to meet its requirements, under the current constraints, is to execute the Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) concept. The RAB concept is an innovative solution to a multi-faceted problem. It addresses the assumptions of the operational environment and the reality of a smaller active component force. RAB allows the Army to be CONUS-based

but still influence regional stability through GCCs theatre campaign plans.<sup>20</sup> The Army Operating Concept describes these forces as, “...those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army forces.”<sup>21</sup> Brigades aligned to a particular GCC and will be provided through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process to achieve a rotational optempo.<sup>22</sup> RAB forces provide a sustained forward presence, capacity building, and other advise and assist functions.<sup>23</sup>

Aligning the brigades regionally allows for increased language and cultural awareness pertinent to the area of operations. Units would continue to train on their traditional mission sets while adding specific mission profiles and environmental considerations applicable to their geographic area of alignment.<sup>24</sup> Even though the base unit for the concept is a BCT, smaller units can be deployed dependent upon the mission requirement of the GCC. Soldiers from the associated unit that don't deploy will continue to train for their assigned area and for emergent tasks.<sup>25</sup> Additionally, deployment lengths may often be of shorter duration than the year that the forces will be allocated for. Deployments for RAB missions are separate and distinct from existing enduring requirements, which require yearlong commitments. Deployment length can be tailored to fit the mission requirement of the GCC and can range from a few months to a full year dependent upon the need. This construct provides predictability to both the unit and the GCC. The RAB concept is an innovative approach to a wicked problem and it also provides a clear opportunity to utilize the vast capabilities of the ARNG.

## **Discussion**

The ARNG is recognized in the Constitution as both a state and federal force.<sup>26</sup> Its primary missions involve employment by state governors for response to natural disasters and

civil unrest. Its secondary mission has always been to serve as a strategic reserve for the nation in times of conflict. However, since 2001 the ARNG has been largely federalized as part of the Global War on Terror. Federalization of the ARNG has been critical to continued accomplishment of the Army's mission. It has also produced a fully operational reserve that provides nearly 40% of the Army's total operating force, which is essential to maintaining operational tempo and global engagement. As stated by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, "The National Guard and Reserve hold a key role in the defense strategy."<sup>27</sup> Federalized use of the ARNG to maintain an operational reserve and partner engagement has become a necessity for national security.

Utilizing the ARNG as an integrated element of the RAB concept is a win-win situation. Regionally aligning ARNG brigades to serve as part of the RAB concept provides institutional benefit to the Army. It also increases the effectiveness of the concept as well as providing critical operational experience to the ARNG. Institutionally, the ARNG provides fully capable manpower and equipment at a reduced cost to the Nation. Utilizing the ARNG preserves operational capabilities necessary for the Army to respond to contingencies. It also ensures a higher state of readiness for the Total Force. Success of the concept is aided by longer career lifecycles of ARNG members, which increases the effectiveness of BPC outcomes. Additionally, the ARNG already has years of experience in capacity building and partnership programs through the State Partnership Program (SPP).<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, the unique mission sets of the ARNG are ideal to not only provide security enhancement but further expansion in other areas of governmental development. National Guard members are also multi-faceted with civilian experience that translates to additional capabilities within the force. Overall the ARNG is an ideal force for implementation of the RAB concept.

## **ARNG Operational Role**

In the coming years, given the foreseeable conditions, the ARNG must fulfill its role in the Total Force as an operational reserve. It is common for the United States to reduce the size and role of its military after a conflict. The Reserve Component musters out and returns members to their civilian employment and their role as a strategic reserve. In the past the reduction was warranted because the threat had been eliminated. In the current environment that is not true. The Active Component alone cannot provide the forces to meet the requirements. Over the next five years the Army will reduce its overall end-strength to 490,000 and only 32 total brigade combat teams (BCT).<sup>29</sup> If sequestration occurs at the end of the second quarter of fiscal year 2013 the Army will be forced to reduce end-strength by another 50,000 in both the Active and Reserve Components. Under the current ARFORGEN the goal is to provide Active Component units at a ratio of one year of deployment every four years. Enduring commitments to South Korea, Kuwait, and the two rapid deployment forces reduces the number of BCTs available to commit to supporting the GCCs. Given four enduring requirements and five GCC requirements, assuming that U.S. Northern Command is not supported with active component brigades, the Army must have nine BCTs available each year. The Active Component force cannot sustain the RAB concept without ARNG forces.

Given that future conflict is not always predictable the Army must be prepared also to respond to contingencies. The Army will be dependent upon the ARNG to provide critical operational capability to do so. The ARNG accounts for 38% of the overall operating force of the Army.<sup>30</sup> The 2012 Army Posture Statement recognizes that, "It is critical that the Army be able to rapidly expand to meet large unexpected contingencies... it will require ready and accessible Army National Guard."<sup>31</sup> Utilizing the ARNG as part of the RAB concept would



allow it to maintain operational capabilities. Failing to utilize the ARNG could result in it returning to an unprepared force that costs the nation money as opposed to saving it. This would be magnified by the forthcoming force reductions. With reduced manpower in the standing Army, the ARNG is a critical portion of the national defense for all contingencies. The ARNG currently fields 128 total brigades in its force. These are comprised of 28 Brigade Combat Teams, 52 multi-functional brigades such as Maneuver Enhancement Brigades, and 48 functional brigades such as Military Police and Chemical Brigades.<sup>32</sup> It is imperative that they be maintained in an operationally capable status. In the first two years after September 11, 2001 nearly 30% of the Reserve Component mobilized for active duty.<sup>33</sup> A large portion of that was from the ARNG. By the end of 2011 over 50% of the ARNG had deployed to combat and at its height provided seven out of fifteen Army brigades, 41% of all Army personnel, serving in Iraq.<sup>34</sup> These facts illustrate the need for the ARNG to be operationally ready early in a conflict.

To provide a near immediate force surge capacity the ARNG must not lose its readiness posture. In previous inter-war years the Army National Guard (ARNG) lacked operational experience and was funded, trained, and equipped at minimal levels. Following the Vietnam War the Army adopted the Total Force concept which was based on the three principles of Mirror Imaging,<sup>35</sup> First to Fight Funding,<sup>36</sup> and Cascading Modernization.<sup>37</sup> These policies provided the ARNG with minimal funding and dilapidated equipment, which degraded the ability of the National Guard to maintain personnel readiness and unit training. When needed, the ARNG took a great deal of time and money to mobilize for operations, which reduced its effectiveness. During the initial years of the current war it took as much as eighteen months of mobilization to achieve twelve months of “boots on the ground” time.<sup>38</sup> This was a result of failed policies under the legacy systems of the Total Force concept, which produced neglectful

readiness support and lax standards for the National Guard, and had to be overcome. These policies resulted in the ARNG requiring significant post mobilization training and equipping in order to be employed operationally.<sup>39</sup> A Government Accounting Office study found the National Guard and Reserves could not effectively mobilize forces. According to Dr. James Carafano, this was due to, “years of chronic underfunding and the lack of effective personnel policies for managing, training, sustaining, mobilizing, deploying, and reconstituting Reserve forces.”<sup>40</sup>

The consequence of this lack of readiness was distrust in the abilities of the ARNG formations and soldiers. Allocating ARNG formations in the ARFORGEN cycle to provide RAB forces can help maintain high levels of readiness along with building and maintaining a cohesive Total Force. Without this recurring mission the ARNG runs the risk of losing ground and reverting back to a second class status. The need to maintain an operationally ready National Guard was recognized by the Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, and Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Casey, in their 2011 Army Posture Statement. As they said, “One thing is certain...we cannot afford to relegate the Army National Guard...back to a strategic reserve. The security of the nation can ill afford a reserve force that is under-manned, under equipped or at lower levels of training and readiness.”<sup>41</sup> Given the speed at which current threats emerge and conflicts erupt, it is detrimental to the nation for its reserve to be placed upon a shelf. Regionally aligning ARNG brigades and utilizing them in a predictable ARFORGEN cycle retains the needed operational capability that has been identified and enhances the Army’s ability to accomplish BPC missions.

One of the prime reasons for the expected success of the RAB program is the greater cultural awareness it can foster within the Army, which in turn increases the possibility of

success in BPC missions. Cultural and language training is a key component to executing the BPC and SFA missions expected of the RAB forces. GEN Odierno, the architect of RAB, stated that, “nothing is more important to your long term success as understanding the prevailing culture and values.”<sup>42</sup> However, cultural and language training is difficult and time consuming. Sufficient expertise in these areas is generally not achieved prior to deployment. The time required to achieve proficiency in cultural aspects is a factor that supports using the ARNG as part of the RAB solution. The career track and greater dwell time between deployments allow for more cultural knowledge to be gained by ARNG soldiers and units. The current ARFORGEN cycle established a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio for active units. In contrast, National Guard units rotate on a 1:4 ratio. The additional time between deployments allows soldiers and leaders to develop skills over time which also can lead to greater understanding. Additionally, the distance learning methods already widely used in the ARNG are better suited to train a large number of personnel in language and culture skills in a cost effective manner. While the institutional benefit of utilizing the ARNG is obvious, the competencies of the ARNG force are what make it an exemplary element in the RAB concept.

### **Smart Power Approach**

The real benefit of utilizing the ARNG in the RAB construct comes from its capabilities, regardless of the conceptual employment of forces. The RAB concept is the method by which the Army intends to implement the BPC mission sets. BPC is simply the military definition of the Smart Power paradigm. The ARNG is among the most capable elements in the Joint Force because it has the inherent and developed capability to provide the elements of Soft Power to achieve the objectives. GEN McKinley, Chief of the National Guard, stated that, “A Smart Power approach to international relations highlights a core competency of the National Guard.”<sup>43</sup>

The ARNG has both intrinsic and tangible benefits that enable it to succeed in this strategy. ARNG members are its first and foremost strength. Long term careers with minimal unit turnover build experience. Extensive experience across a spectrum of civilian careers broadens personnel utility. It has been executing BPC-type missions in many areas of the world for decades. The State Partnership Program and Agri-Business Development Teams are two examples,<sup>44</sup> both of which will be discussed in detail later in this paper. The ARNG is also capable of providing unique capabilities and experience to expand GCC campaign plans. Counter-drug operations, disaster response expertise, and WMD mitigation capabilities can all be utilized to further enhance BPC mission sets in multiple areas of the world. Building Partner Capacity is a business the ARNG has been involved in for a long time.

### **Long Term Relationships**

Building partner capacity requires that long term relationships be established, a task which is well suited to the ARNG force structure. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, explains that, “Most capacity building focuses on long-term technical assistance programs.”<sup>45</sup> ARNG soldiers are often members of the same unit for much of their career. If used in RAB rotations, such stability would build trust with partner nation elements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, GEN Dempsey, acknowledged this by stating, “ARNG elements are better-suited than the active components to develop and leverage career-long relationships because of the way that active component service members move around. The continuity in these relationships contributes to a high level of trust.”<sup>46</sup> A second benefit of the ARNG force structure is a capacity for a deeper understanding of the partner nation or region of the world. Career long alignment can develop a service member who is intimately familiar with the culture and capabilities of a partner state. This level of established trust pays dividends in strategic

posture. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael Mullen stated, "Developing a relationship on the battlefield in the midst of a crisis with someone I've never met before can be very challenging . . . Trust has to be built up over time. You can't surge trust."<sup>47</sup> The ARNG is capable of developing these relationships and already has years of experience in building partner capacity and trust.

### **State Partnership**

The ARNG has a proven proficiency in BPC which highlights the value of long term partner relationships. The ARNG State Partnership Program began in 1993. At its core the SPP is a security cooperation program that has extensive interagency coordination.<sup>48</sup> It partners state National Guard elements and civil agencies with foreign nation states. Currently there are 65 partnerships established around the world, and partnerships exist in the areas of responsibility of all six GCCs. All GCCs have approved of and requested continuance of the SPP.<sup>49</sup> Many ARNG soldiers have deployed to combat with their partner nations as part of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). The U.S. receives a return on this investment, such as when twenty-three SPP affiliate nations contributed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).<sup>50</sup> This type of contribution is precisely what the RAB concept is intended to produce. The SPP is more than a Whole of Government approach that is called for in the 2010 NSS. "As an additional benefit, the Reserve Component can provide experience in interacting with other institutions of U.S. power such as business, education, and state and local governments, thus enabling not only whole-of-government solutions but the potential for whole-of-nation solutions."<sup>51</sup>

The success of the SPP has illustrated many other benefits of utilizing the ARNG in BPC. ARNG soldiers bring additional skill sets beyond their military specialty and rank. ARNG soldiers come from all walks of life and civilian professions ranging from construction to business executive to state and federal legislatures. When utilized for their civilian professional experience ARNG formations are capable of providing a GCC with a wide range of capabilities far beyond the single dimension of security assistance. They are capable of providing assistance in many facets of national interest and capacity building by sharing their expertise in civilian matters of all types. This fact was identified in the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component, which stated, “Reserve Component personnel are also more likely to bring many of the critical skills required during Building Partner Capacity or Theater Security Cooperation activities, including expertise in agriculture, business, finance, governance, and rule of law.”<sup>52</sup>

### **ARNG Unique Capabilities**

The 2011 National Military Strategy directs the GCC and Service Chiefs to plan and implement Theatre Security Cooperation. The direction clearly articulated a link between security cooperation and the need to provide Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) capabilities within their Areas of Responsibility (AOR) as a way to build confidence and trust. The plan must include actively partnering with other government and host nation agencies, and preparation to support the United States Agency for International Development.<sup>53</sup> It also identifies the need to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as part of the strategy to Deter and Defeat Aggression.<sup>54</sup> ARNG forces are tailor-made to assist GCCs in accomplishing these requirements. ARNG units are expertly trained and capable of providing HADR support and training to partner nations within the GCC AOR. It is a primary

mission of every formation across the force. They are also manned, trained, equipped, and highly proficient in counter proliferation of WMD and responses to WMD events. The House Committee on the Armed Forces applauded the wide range of capacity building expertise the ARNG is able to bring to mission sets based on their traditional missions of humanitarian assistance, emergency management, consequence management, emergency communications, disaster relief, counter-trafficking and counter-proliferation.<sup>55</sup> Obviously ARNG formations are much better suited to provide these capabilities, which make them multi-faceted force multipliers when allocated to GCCs.

A core function of the ARNG is to provide Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA).<sup>56</sup> ARNG leaders are archetypal managers in multi-faceted collaboration with military, federal, state, and local authorities. The 2010 NSS highlights the need for multi-functional approach to building partner capacity. “Successful engagement will depend upon the effective use and integration of different elements of American Power.”<sup>57</sup> This approach predicates military partnership with and deep involvement from multiple governmental and non-governmental organizations to affect long term desired outcomes of stabilizing and supporting partner nations. This multi-faceted approach requires infinite levels of coordination and cooperation with civilian authorities and organizations, and necessitates that the military play a supporting role in many cases. Many BPC mission sets will be analogous to DSCA and several elements of ARNG unique operational capabilities can provide critical components for GCC campaign planning.

One of the unique proficiencies of the ARNG is a robust capability in counterdrug operations, which has been in place since 1989. The counterdrug program is an ARNG-unique ability to merge military capability with civilian and law enforcement authority to directly

respond to a national threat. According to its mission statement, “The National Guard Counterdrug Program conducts a full spectrum campaign that bridges the gap between Department of Defense and Non-DoD institutions in the fight against illicit drugs and transnational threats to the Homeland.”<sup>58</sup> Definitive linkage has been established among narcotic traffickers, transnational criminal elements, and terrorist or militant groups. “Illicit drug trafficking, smuggling of every sort, and the regional and global movement of terrorists are closely linked by financial, political, and operational linkages.”<sup>59</sup> These linkages have expanded the geographic dispersion of illicit drug operations. The major production areas of the world may not shift. But the supply chain activities have established the need for counterdrug operations in all corners of the globe. This linkage requires that GCC establish campaign objectives to effectively combat these elements in support of partner nations. “Combatant commanders are responsible for planning and executing DOD counterdrug operations within their areas of responsibilities.”<sup>60</sup> Utilizing ARNG forces as part of the RAB brings its counterdrug capability to bear for the GCC. All ARNG states and territories have counterdrug headquarters and programs, which translates into a broad institutional knowledge within the force. In addition, the ARNG has standing partnerships with elements such as DEA and other government organizations in the counterdrug arena. This results in experience and effectiveness in supporting non-DoD organizations and operating in a law enforcement support capacity. In contrast Active Component soldiers and units are seldom if ever exposed to counterdrug operations. This lack of experience would require considerable time and resources to bring them on par with their ARNG counterparts.

The counterdrug capabilities of the ARNG are extremely robust and are fully capable of supporting GCC outcomes. There are six elements within ARNG counterdrug operations; Civil



Operations, Federal Operations, Counterdrug Training Centers, Aviation, Prevention Treatment and Outreach, Analysis and Fusion. Civil Operations empowers local communities to develop and implement programs for specific problems affecting their areas. Federal Operations has provided forces for multiple GCCs, federal law enforcement, and interagency task forces to support counterdrug operations. The training centers provide relevant, up-to-date, and exportable training. Aviation programs provide specifically outfitted platforms that are uniquely tailored to support counterdrug operations. Prevention, Treatment and Outreach programs assist community leaders in combating the use of illicit drugs. The Analysis and Fusion program is a specially designed and trained intelligence apparatus which is able to detect, deter, and defeat illegal drug and transnational threats.<sup>61</sup> All of these programs can be exported to GCC areas of responsibility to support their missions. The ARNG's ability to apply these programs to building partner capacity would be a huge benefit to the RAB concept.

Another capacity building ability unique to the ARNG is the Agri-Business Development Team (ADT), which are filled with experts from within ranks of the states. These teams are another example of a Smart Power approach to strengthening partnerships and building capacity. The concept developed from 25 years' worth of experience providing similar support to areas of South and Central America.<sup>62</sup> The teams first deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The benefits of the program are far reaching. They improve quality of life in the rural areas of supported nations and increase overall economic well-being. The teams are able to combine the valuable civilian professional experience of the soldiers with subject matter experts from the civilian sectors of the United States. This capability provides a grass roots approach to improving U.S. standing among the people of the world. The ADTs bring their capabilities to

bear in an inter-agency approach to building partner capacity and establishing trust among the people of the supported nations.

Finally the ARNG is a premier force for countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Counter WMD operations are emphasized in the highest national security policies. Detection and incident response are critical aspects of GCC campaign plans. The ARNG currently possesses a robust and highly trained force capable of dealing with and training partner nations to manage these threats. The Civil Support Team and Homeland Response Force models developed and fielded by the ARNG are prime examples of high payoff BPC mission sets to be employed in the RAB concept. ARNG elements are ideal to build this critical competency in support of the mandated outcomes for the GCCs.

### **Implications of Federalized ARNG**

Regionally aligning ARNG brigades and utilizing them in the Army's construct to build partner capacity has obvious benefits to both components. However, there are several disadvantages. State governors lose some of their capability to respond to natural disasters and civil unrest while ARNG forces are deployed for overseas contingency missions. Deploying forces from smaller states that have limited assets, including reduced ARNG elements, could produce a scenario where the state could not respond effectively to state emergencies. This condition can be resolved by proper planning, force allocations, and dual status command relationships. The five year ARFORGEN model for ARNG forces should provide for cases where a particular state might have insufficient forces for domestic response. In those cases, the ARNG can allocate contingency forces from other states to be prepared for emergency domestic deployment in their available year. There are also standing ARNG Homeland Response Forces (HRF) allocated to each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency's regions that are available for use in

domestic response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High explosive (CBRNE).<sup>63</sup> Additionally, active forces could be deployed to the affected state and placed under the Adjutant General, who has been given dual Title 32 and Title 10 Authority.

There are also individual impacts that must be addressed. Continuing to utilize the ARNG in an active rotational basis also requires more training and duty days from its soldiers in order to maintain readiness and proficiency. It is estimated that an additional week of annual training will be required of ARNG soldiers in order to meet requirements. This additional time is time away from an employer who must make up for the lost production or backfill the employee with someone else. Additionally, recurring deployments may make ARNG soldiers less desirable to potential employers, making it difficult for members to gain or maintain employment. Absence from civilian employment for extended periods should not be the rule however. With a 1:5 ratio of availability to dwell and a rotational construct of which units actually deploy the impact on employers can be minimized. There are also laws that protect employee rights for Guardsmen but they will need to be strictly enforced in order to enable the ARNG to fulfill operational roles.

Recruiting and retention could also suffer if the ARNG moves away from its traditional training cycle of one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer cycle. Potential recruits who favored the limited requirements of membership in the ARNG may not enlist. But this potential pitfall has two silver linings. First, the fact is that 80% of the current ARNG force enlisted after September 2001.<sup>64</sup> This suggests that the soldiers currently serving are dedicated to their service of the nation and fully accept the requirements of an operational force. On the other side of the spectrum is a large non-deployment gap. Between September 2001 and December 2004 the

ARNG had to transfer 74,000 soldiers between commands to meet operational deployment requirements.<sup>65</sup> This fact illustrates a readiness issue within the force, particularly early in the war. It would require a more detailed analysis to determine the exact issue, but medical ineligibility likely played a large role. As the Active Component draws down it provides the ARNG with an opportunity to correct this issue by separating those individuals who are incapable of meeting deployment requirements. The vacancies can be filled by actively recruiting separating Active Component soldiers who are deployable and want to continue to serve in a more predictable environment. This would be a first step in implementing a Continuum of Service construct that is sought by the Army to maintain the vast reservoir of skills and experience potentially lost by downsizing.

## **Conclusion**

The United States is undertaking a significant shift in strategic security policy. The policy recognizes that the United States can no longer guarantee its own security, safeguard its national interests abroad, and defend the security of allies without being globally engaged. The new policy also identifies the fact that unilateral action in the face of multi-dimensional threats will not ensure stability and prosperity for the nation or other strategic geographic regions of the world. Only through fully devoted and capable partners will the interests of the U.S. be protected and regional stability maintained. Furthermore, the application of military power alone will not bring about the broad and long term improvements required to prevent and deter aggression and deny safe haven to terrorist organizations. The notion of raising others up to ensure security requires innovation from the military.

As a critical component of the nation's security, the Army's Regionally Aligned Brigade concept is an innovative and critically important approach to meeting the goals of the national security strategy. This concept is predicated on building trust with partner nations while increasing their capacity to effectively govern and secure themselves. In doing so, the Geographic Combatant Commands ensure the security of the United States by assisting partner nations in a whole of government approach. This concept requires deep understanding of the needs of the partner nations and how to effectively empower them to achieve self-reliance.

The Army National Guard should play an equal role in the RAB concept. As part of the Army's Total Force the ARNG has the most robust capability to effectively implement the requirements of building partner capacity. It has a long history of executing partnership building through its State Partnership Program. More importantly the ARNG possesses the skills required to enhance the RAB concept. Its unique mission capabilities provide the GCCs with increased potential to fully meet partner nation requirements ranging from security force assistance to agricultural improvement. Additionally, individual abilities of ARNG soldiers provide unique opportunities to tailor the force structure specifically to the needs of the GCC and its partner nations. Individual professionals across the spectrum of civilian industry are capable of influencing the outcome of theatre campaign plans without additional training. This connection also has a potential second order effect of producing positive connections between individuals and communities in the U.S. and abroad which can exponentially increase the probability of success.

## NOTES

---

<sup>1</sup> Claudette Roulo, "Panetta: National Guard, Reserve Key to Defense Strategy", American Forces Press Service, August 13, 2012, <http://www.army.mil/article/85411/>.

<sup>2</sup> Todd C. Lopez, "Odierno: Force Reductions will be Responsible and Controlled", Army News Service, 27 January 2012, [http://www.army.mil/article/72692/Odierno\\_Force\\_reductions\\_will\\_be\\_responsible\\_controlled/](http://www.army.mil/article/72692/Odierno_Force_reductions_will_be_responsible_controlled/).

<sup>3</sup> Department of the Army, *2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, 19 April 2012, 4-6.

<sup>4</sup> President Barrack H. Obama, 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), May 2010, 11,26.

<sup>5</sup> 2010 NSS, 41.

<sup>6</sup> 2010 NSS, 11.

<sup>7</sup> 2010 NSS, 14.

<sup>8</sup> Craig Cohen, Joseph S. Nye, Richard L. Armitage, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007, 7.

<sup>9</sup> Department of Defense, *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, 13-15.

<sup>10</sup> 2010 QDR, 11-16.

<sup>11</sup> 2010 QDR, 27.

<sup>12</sup> Cheryl Pellerin, "Panetta Details Steps Needed to End al-Qaida Threat", American Forces Press Service, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118606>.

<sup>13</sup> 2010 QDR, 26

<sup>14</sup> 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 4.

<sup>15</sup> 2010 QDR, 26.

<sup>16</sup> Department of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*, October 2008, 1-8.

<sup>17</sup> FM 3-07, 15

<sup>18</sup> 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 1.

<sup>19</sup> Department of the Army, *TRADOC PAM 525-3-0 The U.S. Army Capstone Concept*, 19 December 2012, 5.

<sup>20</sup> David Vergun, "Army's Strategic Vision Plan Unveiled", The Army News Service, 26 December 2012, [http://www.army.mil/article/93535/Army\\_s\\_strategic\\_vision\\_plan\\_unveiled/](http://www.army.mil/article/93535/Army_s_strategic_vision_plan_unveiled/).

<sup>21</sup> Department of the Army, *TRADOC PAM 525-3-1 The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, 19 August 2010, 16.

<sup>22</sup> ARFORGEN is the cyclic process the Army uses to man, equip, and train units to meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements. ARFORGEN is designed to focus training, training support, and other limited resources for units as they prepare for operational employment in a timely predictable manner. ARFORGEN cycles units through three separate and distinct force pools to include RESET, Train-Ready, and Available. Resourcing and training support increase as units progress through the Force Pools in order to assist commanders in meeting their readiness objectives to move into the Available Pool. This recurring cycle of units provides required trained, ready, and cohesive RC units prepared for operational deployment in support of Combatant Commanders and Civil Authorities worldwide. (Army Regulation 525-29, 14 March 2011).

<sup>23</sup> Army Operating Concept, 16.

<sup>24</sup> Rob McIlvaine, "Odierno: Regional Alignments to Begin Next Year", *The Army News Service*, 16 May 2012, <http://www.army.mil/article/79919/>.

<sup>25</sup> GEN Raymond Odierno, "Regionally Aligned Forces: A New Model for Building Partnerships," *Armylive* (blog), 22 March 2012, <http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/>.

<sup>26</sup> John Nagel and Travis Sharp, "An Indispensable Force: *Investing in America's National Guard and Reserve*", Center for New American Security, September 2010, 17.

<sup>27</sup> Claudette Roulo, "Panetta: National Guard, Reserve Key to Defense Strategy", American Forces Press Service, 13 August 2012, <http://www.army.mil/article/85411/>.

<sup>28</sup> The State Partnership Program directly supports the broad national interests and security cooperation goals of the United States by engaging partner nations via military, socio-political, and economic conduits

at the local, state, and national levels. The program's public diplomacy effectiveness lies in its ability to leverage the full breadth and depth of U.S. defense and interagency capabilities from within the state-country relationship. The State Partnership Program evolved from a 1993 European Command decision to set up the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) in the Baltics with reserve component Soldiers and Airmen. At the time, it was believed reserve component personnel would present a less provocative posture to the new Russian Federation. A subsequent National Guard Bureau proposal to pair state National Guards with the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania formally initiated the program. Since then, the program has grown far beyond JCTP and is now a key US security cooperation tool, facilitating mutual cooperation across all aspects of international civil-military affairs. (NGB SPP Info Paper, NGB J5, January 2007).

<sup>29</sup> C. Todd Lopez, "Regional unit alignments could match brigades with combatant commanders", 24 February 2012,

[http://www.army.mil/article/74452/Regional\\_unit\\_alignments\\_could\\_match\\_brigades\\_with\\_combatant\\_commanders/](http://www.army.mil/article/74452/Regional_unit_alignments_could_match_brigades_with_combatant_commanders/),

<sup>30</sup> Army National Guard, "The Army National Guard: A Great Value for America White Paper", Army National Guard Bureau, 17 February 2010, 3.

<sup>31</sup> 2012 Army Posture Statement, 7

<sup>32</sup> The National Guard Bureau, *2013 National Guard Posture Statement*, 6.

<sup>33</sup> James J. Carafano, "The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future", *The Heritage Lecture*, no. 869, (18 April 2005): 10.

<sup>34</sup> The National Guard Bureau, "The Army National Guard: A Great Value for America White Paper", 17 February 2012, 2-6

<sup>35</sup> Mirror Imaging called for keeping the same kinds of combat units in both the Active force and the National Guard (i.e., armored brigades and divisions). This principle held that the Guard would be a more equal and relevant partner if it had a similar force structure. Thus, the Guard retained large, expensive, and complex heavy combat forces, though it lacked the time and resources to maintain their readiness or mobilize and deploy them efficiently.

<sup>36</sup> First to Fight Funding – Units that were likely to see combat first should have all the financial resources they needed to be fully armed, trained, and manned. The remaining forces, primarily in the Reserve Components, received minimal funding for maintenance of equipment and individual and crew training. This resulted in steeply tiered readiness, with many Reserve and National Guard units being unready for deployment without significant post-mobilization training and equipping.

<sup>37</sup> Cascading Modernization called for Reserves and National Guard to receive equipment from Active forces after the Active units had been modernized. Saddled with older and worn equipment, the Reserves and National Guard would face higher maintenance costs, suffer less equipment availability, and have less capability than the Active forces.

<sup>38</sup> LTC Erich Randall, "Mobilizing the National Guard", *Armed Forces Journal*, September 2008, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/09/3651732/>.

<sup>39</sup> Carafano, 9

<sup>40</sup> Carafano, 10

<sup>41</sup> Department of the Army, *2011 Army Posture Statement*, 12

<sup>42</sup> GEN Ray Odierno blog

<sup>43</sup> GEN Craig R. McKinley, *The National Guard: A Great Value for America*, July 2010, 7.

<sup>44</sup> An Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) composed of Army National Guard soldiers with backgrounds and expertise in various sectors of the agribusiness field has been formed to provide training and advice to Afghan universities, provincial ministries, and local farmers. ADT members also bring personal ties and relationships that allow them to leverage the assets and expertise of Land Grant Universities (LGUs) and Cooperative Extension Services within their home state. The ARNG has employed the Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) concept successfully in Central America for approximately 20 years. (2008 Army Posture Statement, Information Papers)

<sup>45</sup> FM 3-07, 1-8.

<sup>46</sup> Claudette Roulo, "Dempsey: Forming Partnerships Vital for Future Force", *Armed Forces Press*, 18 July 2012, <http://www.army.mil/article/83792/>

<sup>47</sup> Admiral James G. Stavridis, Colonel Bart Howard, *Strengthening the Bridge: Building Partner Capacity*, *Military Review*, January – February 2010, 2.

---

<sup>48</sup> National Guard Bureau, J5, International Affairs Division, "National Guard State Partnership Program," January 2007.

<sup>49</sup> COCOM Partner nation distribution is: SOUTHCOM 21, PACOM 6, CENTCOM 6, AFRICOM 8, EUCOM 22, NORTHCOM 1, Columbia has also requested partnership

<sup>50</sup> 2011 Army Posture Statement, ARNG State Partnership Program (SPP) Information Paper

<sup>51</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component*, 5 April 2011, 57.

<sup>52</sup> DoD, *Comprehensive Review*, 57.

<sup>53</sup> 2011 National Military Strategy, 15.

<sup>54</sup> 2011 National Military Strategy, 7.

<sup>55</sup> National Guard Bureau Office of Legislative Liaison, *Analysis of H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013*, 3 January 2013, 14.

<sup>56</sup> GEN Craig R. McKinley, The National Guard: A Great Value for America, July 2010, 3

<sup>57</sup> 2010 NSS, 11.

<sup>58</sup> National Guard Bureau J-32, "About the National Guard Counterdrug Program", accessed 8 January 2013, <http://ngbcounterdrug.ng.mil/aboutus/Pages/default.aspx>.

<sup>59</sup> Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-07.4 Joint Counterdrug Operations*, 13 June 2007, ix.

<sup>60</sup> JP 3-07, xii.

<sup>61</sup> National Guard Bureau J-32, "About the National Guard Counterdrug Program", accessed 8 January 2013, <http://ngbcounterdrug.ng.mil/aboutus/Pages/default.aspx>.

<sup>62</sup> GEN Craig R. McKinley, The National Guard: A Great Value for America, July 2010, 8.

<sup>63</sup> Ten National Guard-sourced HRFs will be comprised of National Guard soldiers and airmen.

Regionally oriented, each of the HRFs will be hosted by one state in each of the FEMA regions. HRFs will increase the focus of DoD Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management Response forces on lifesaving objectives and increase operational flexibility. Eight HRFs (FEMA Regions Three - Ten) will be sourced from single states. The other two HRFs located in FEMA Regions One and Two will be sourced from multiple states within those regions. The state contributing the HRF command and control element will be considered the "host" state. Each HRF will be composed of approximately 570 personnel. HRFs will have a six to twelve hour response posture and will primarily be equipped to deploy via ground transport to CBRNE incident sites, but can be moved by air if necessary.

<sup>64</sup> 2013 National Guard Posture Statement, 6.

<sup>65</sup> Carafano, 10.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Army National Guard, “The Army National Guard: A Great Value for America White Paper”, Army National Guard Bureau, 17 February 2010, 3.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component, Volume I & Main Report. Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, 5 April 2011.

Carafano, James Jay. “The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future.” *Heritage Lectures*, no. 869 (18 April 2005)  
[www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/hl869.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/hl869.cfm).

Center for a New American Security. *An indispensable force: investing in America's National Guard and Reserves*. Washington, DC, 2010.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. *The future of the National Guard and Reserves: the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols phase III report*, Washington, DC, 2006.

Center for Strategic & International Studies. “CSIS Commission on Smart Power, A smarter, more secure America.” The CSIS Press. 2007.

Craig Cohen, Joseph S. Nye, Richard L. Armitage, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007.

Department of the Army, *2011 Army Posture Statement*.

Department of the Army. “2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance.” 20012.  
<http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/243816.pdf>.

Department of the Army. “Grass: National Guard solution to problems in fiscally constrained times.” News release, September 12, 2012, <http://www.army.mil/article/87133/>.

Department of the Army, *TRADOC PAM 525-3-0 The U.S. Army Capstone Concept*, 19 December 2012, 5.

Department of Defense. *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. February 2010.

Department of Defense. *Joint Counterdrug Operations*. Joint Publication 3-07.4. 13 June 2007.

Griffin, Steve. “Regionally-Aligned Brigades: There’s More to This Plan Than Meets the Eye.” *Small Wars Journal*. (19 September 2012). <http://smallwarsjournal.com>.

Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *Stability Operation*. FM 3-07. October 2008.

Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. *The U.S. Army Capstone Concept*. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0. Ft. Eustis, VA: Headquarter U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, December 19, 2012.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Counterdrug Operations*. JP 3-07.4. Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, June 13, 2007.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The National Military Strategy of The United States of America 2011, Redefining America's Military Leadership. Arlington, VA: The Pentagon, 8 February 2011.

Lawson, Christopher F. "National Guard State Partnership Program: A Means for Statecraft." Master's thesis, U.S. Army War College. 2011. <http://stinet.dtic.mil/>.

McKinley, Craig R. "The National Guard A Great Value for America." National Guard Bureau. July 2010.

McKinley, Craig R. "The National Guard: A Great Value Today and in the Future." National Guard Bureau. March 30, 2011.

Midgely, Jack. "Building Partner Capability, Defining an Army Role in Future Small Wars." *Small Wars Journal*. (20 February 2012). <http://smallwarsjournal.com>.

Nagl, John A. and Sharp, Travis. "Operational for What' The Future of the Guard and Reserves." *National Defense University Press*. September 28, 2010. <http://www.ndu.edu/press/>

National Guard Bureau. *2013 National Guard Posture Statement*.

National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard G5. "The Army National Guard: A Great Value for America White Paper." (version 1). 17 February 2012.

National Guard Bureau, Public Affairs. State Partnership Program Information Paper. March 2011. [www.ng.mil](http://www.ng.mil).

Scott G. Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity / Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, The Letort Papers, February 2009.

Smith, Edward S. "Army National Guard: Regionally Aligned Brigade Force of First Choice." Master's thesis, U.S. Army War College. 2012. <http://stinet.dtic.mil/>.

Stavridis, James G. and Howard, Bart. "Strengthening The Bridge: Building Partnership Capacity." *Military Review*. 1 January 2010. <http://www.readperiodicals.com/201001/1963066511.html>.

U.S. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011, Redefining America's Military Leadership." February 8, 2011.

U.S. President. "National Security Strategy." May 2010.

U.S. Secretary of Defense. "Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense." January 2012.

Williams, James N. "The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power." Master's thesis, U.S. Army War College. 2012. <http://stinet.dtic.mil/>.